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ABSTRACT. This paper evaluates the economic assumptions of economic theory via an
examination of the capitalist transformation of creditor–debtor relations in the 18th century.
This transformation enabled masses of people to obtain credit without moral opprobrium or
social subordination. Classical 18th century economics had the ethical concepts to appreciate
these facts. Ironically, contemporary economic theory cannot. I trace this fault to its abstract
representations of freedom, efficiency, and markets. The virtues of capitalism lie in the
concrete social relations and social meanings through which capital and commodities are
exchanged. Contrary to laissez faire capitalism, the conditions for sustaining these concrete
capitalist formations require limits on freedom of contract and the scope of private property
rights.
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1. CAPITALISM AS AN ABSTRACTION: THE FORMALISM
OF ECONOMIC THEORY
A central function of economic theory is to explain and evaluate the opera-
tions of capitalist economies. Is economic theory up to the evaluative task?
To perform this task, its concepts must be able to adequately represent the
virtues and vices of capitalism. That is, when these concepts are applied to
actual capitalist practices and institutions, they must be able to discriminate
between their better and worse features, and enable measurement of the
degree to which they satisfy normative requirements.
Most critics of the normative framework of economic theory fault it
for failing to recognize the vices of capitalism – for example, its inability
to evaluate the inequality that capitalism generates. My thesis turns this
critique on its head: the assumptions of economic theory fail to represent
some of the virtues of capitalism. They fail to grasp some ways in which
capitalism advanced freedom and equality. One way was by transforming
the social relations of creditors to debtors. This enabled millions of people
to obtain credit without having to give up their personal independence to
or demean themselves before their creditors.
I shall argue that the ethical assumptions of economic theory cannot
represent this transformation as virtuous, because they are too abstract.
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The kinds of freedom and equality that fundamentally matter, and that cap-
italism expanded, are embodied in concrete social relations governed by
specific legal constraints and social norms. Freedom involves, at least, free-
dom from bondage to others. Equality involves a kind of social standing
before others, premised on terms of interaction consistent with the dig-
nity of both parties. Economic theory represents freedom and equality in
abstraction from these concrete social relations. It represents freedom as
freedom of contract – freedom to alienate any property to another, includ-
ing property in the self. Equality is formal equality – the equal right to enter
contracts and own property. These abstractions do not distinguish between
free contracts and contracts into bondage, or between agreements reached
by self-debasement or a dignified offer.
It follows that the virtues of capitalism cannot be deduced from the
bare forms of private property and voluntary exchange. They depend on
conditions not represented in the standard economic arguments for capi-
talism. These conditions often require constraints on the scope of freedom
of contract and property rights, against the laissez faire ideal.
2. THREE MORAL ECONOMIES OF DEBT
Let us explore the development of creditor–debtor relations as our window
into the moral transformations brought about by capitalism in Europe and
America. At the emergence of the transatlantic economy of Europe and her
American colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries, three moral economies
of debt were in play: Christian, aristocratic, and capitalist.
Within the Christian ethic, credit had long been a morally perilous in-
stitution. For centuries, the Catholic Church had prohibited, on Biblical
authority (Deut. 23:19), the charging of interest among Christians. The
task of doing so was assigned to Jews, who were thereby constituted as so-
cial pariahs (Nelson, 1969, pp. 6, 14). Although the Protestant Reformation
had relaxed the rules against interest (Nelson, 1969, pp. 67, 78–83), and in-
terest had become indispensable to the transatlantic economy, the granting
of loans among Christians without interest was still commonplace. By the
18th century, the main moral onus of credit rested with debtors. Indebted-
ness carried a moral taint, suggesting profligacy and vanity. Failure to pay
off one’s debts was a sin. Debtors in default could be bound over in service
to their creditors, or thrown into debtors’ prison. These punishments were
mentioned in the Bible (e.g., 2 Kings 4:1; Matthew 18:25), and widely
practiced in Europe and the Americas.1
1This is not to say that the claimed Biblical warrant for such harsh treatment of debtors
is sound. The Bible consistently praises mercy toward debtors and calls for the cancellation
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The aristocratic ethic viewed indebtedness with greater indulgence. A
lifestyle befitting someone of superior social status could often be sustained
only on credit. More importantly, aristocrats and gentlemen used credit a
means of binding social inferiors to them. Servants, peasants, and other
social inferiors would often come to them, pleading for loans. They would
record such loans in book accounts, which had open-ended terms and car-
ried no interest (Mann, 2002, p. 10). The lack of interest did not mean that
creditors exacted no price from their debtors in return for a loan. The price
of credit was subjection to one’s creditor (Wood, 1993, pp. 68–73). This
entailed acknowledgment of an inferior social status. One needed to defer
to one’s creditor, humble oneself before him. In the American colonies,
the leading gentlemen were responsible for raising militias for collective
defense. They summoned the militia from among their debtors, who were
obliged to recognize their creditors as their military commanders (Wood,
1993, p. 74). If debtors became insolvent, they could be bound over in
service to their creditor (Mann, 2002, p. 79). Debtors’ prison put insolvent
debtors at the mercy of their creditors. Debtors in default were put in prison
via a civil (not a criminal) process, and could be held there indefinitely at
the will of their creditors. The state provided imprisoned debtors no food,
clothing, medical treatment, or heat. They had to beg for subsistence, and
many died (Mann, 2002, pp. 81, 87–88).
During the 18th century, a capitalist ethic of debt challenged both the
Christian and the aristocratic ethics. Consider first the Christian ethic. Moral
doubts about charging interest were dealt a death knell by the ubiquity of
interest in the emerging capitalist order. More significantly, moral oppro-
brium can hardly attach to a condition necessary for the pursuit of nearly
any occupation. In the transatlantic economy, debt had become such a
condition. Long-distance commerce entailed a temporal gap between an
American merchant’s contract to purchase European manufactured goods
and his acquisition of the revenue needed to pay off his wholesaler. The
gap was covered by a bill of exchange, which constituted a debt until it was
presented for payment in coin. American farmers, producing cash crops for
the European market, could no less avoid debt. They required an advance
from European merchants for seeds, tools, and food until they could deliver
their crops in payment. Since credit was essential to production, it could
no longer be regarded as a sign of prodigality and sloth. As Adam Smith
observed, “Among borrowers . . . the number of the frugal and industrious
surpasses considerably that of the prodigal and idle” (Smith, 1974 [1776],
pp. 450–451).
of debts every seven years (Deut. 15; see also Lev. 25:10–28). This debtor-friendly Biblical
tradition informs contemporary Christian movements for international debtor relief. See,
for example, Ecumenical Steering Committee for Jubilee 2000-Zambia (1998).
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The rise of capitalism blunted the moral edge of insolvency, by raising the
salience of causes of insolvency that could not be attributed to vice (Mann,
2002, pp. 46–47, 82–83). Indebted farmers could be ruined by bad weather,
or a fall in the price of their crop. Indebted merchants could be ruined by
sunken ships, or the default of their own debtors. Capitalist business cycles
tied the fortunes of everyone together, independent of variations in their
moral probity.
Capitalism posed equally grave challenges to the aristocratic ethic. The
assignability of debts to distant creditors via bills of exchange fatally un-
dermined the logic of gift and honor that grounded the aristocratic moral
economy. The contract between gentleman creditor and low-born debtor
traded money for personal recognition, in the form of obsequiousness and
subservience. This type of compensation could be exacted only so long
as creditors and debtors stood in face-to-face social relations. Debts as-
signed to distant and anonymous creditors could not be so easily paid in
the currency of social recognition. A debtor cannot bow and scrape before
a creditor hundreds or thousands of miles away, nor could an anonymous
creditor bask in the glory of such a display. Economic interest, not honor,
motivated the creditors to whom distant debts were assigned.
This fact undermined the motive for seeking punitive treatment of insol-
vent debtors. Creditors in the game for the glory could feel compensated for
unpaid debts by putting their debtor at their mercy in prison. This arrange-
ment offered no advantage to creditors motivated by profit. An imprisoned
debtor could not work to pay off his debts.
Finally, the capitalist ethos generated a powerful rationale for laws en-
abling voluntary bankruptcy. Insolvents burdened with overwhelming debts
had little incentive to work, knowing that the fruits of their labors would go
to their previous creditors. Bankruptcy, by discharging unpaid debts, facil-
itates the reintegration of insolvents into the economy, rather than leaving
their talents and energies to waste (Mann, 2002, p. 58). It is also economi-
cally superior to bondage. A bonded debtor would be unlikely to be put to
his most economically productive uses, if he was prevented from seeking
other employers.
3. WHY THE CAPITALIST MORAL ECONOMY OF DEBT WAS
AN ETHICAL ADVANCE
I shall now argue that the triumph of the capitalist ethic of debt over the
aristocratic and Christian ethics greatly advanced freedom and equality.
By freedom, I mean personal independence: freedom from bondage,
from others’ dominion. This was the view of freedom held by the classical
economists Smith and Condorcet (Rothschild, 2001, pp. 22, 23, 70, 202).
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Condorcet defined liberty as “not being dependent . . . on the whims of a
man”: “a man is called free if he is not subject in any of his private actions
to the arbitrary will of an individual” (Rothschild, 2001, p. 202). Smith
commended capitalist manufacturing and commerce over aristocratic agri-
culture for promoting the personal independence of workers. Servants, re-
tainers, and tenants were dependent on and subservient to their landlords.
By contrast, “commerce and manufactures” improved the “liberty and se-
curity of individuals” by releasing them from “servile dependency on their
superiors.” “This . . . is by far the most important of their effects” (Smith,
1974 [1776], p. 508).
The abolition of debtors’ prison, bondage, and debt peonage amounts to
liberation from one’s creditors. This constituted a vast increase in human
freedom. Bankruptcy laws advanced freedom even more. Discharge enables
insolvent debtors to escape permanent receivership. More generally, credit
can be obtained without submission. No one today imagines that obtaining
a mortgage obliges him to join a militia run by the president of their bank.
By equality, I mean a social standing whereby one makes claims without
casting them either as orders to inferiors, or as supplications of superiors.
In the era of interest-free account books, people had to beg for loans from
superiors. They got credit by flattering their creditors’ pride. In a wholly
capitalist transaction, people get what they want by appealing to others’
interest, not their pride. This enables both sides to preserve their dignity.
Adam Smith stressed this point in his famous remarks on the human ten-
dency “to truck, barter, and exchange”:
When an animal wants to obtain something . . . it has no other means of persuasion but
to gain the favor of those whose services it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and
a spaniel endeavors by a thousand attractions to engage the attention of his master who
is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his
brethren, and . . . endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good
will. . . . But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in
vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail
if he can . . . show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires
of them . . .. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves,
not to their humanity, but to their self-love . . . . Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend
chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens (Smith, 1974 [1776], pp. 118–119).2
Smith reminds us that dependence on others’ good will comes at a steep
price in personal dignity, which we avoid when we interact with them on
the basis of mutual self-interest.
The ability of ordinary people to obtain credit with dignity reflects a
larger transformation in the moral economy of social status made possible
2I thank Stephen Darwall for pointing out the significance of this passage to me.
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by capitalism. The aristocratic moral economy of debt was enmeshed in the
logic of gift rather than commercial exchange. Credit was seen as a form of
charity to the needy and dependent (Wood, 1993, p.140). Honor redounds
to whoever bestows such charity, setting the gift-giver on a higher social
plane than the recipient. Recipients of unreciprocated gifts are obliged to
honor and obey their benefactors. Because gift-giving bestows honor, it is
an object of competition. This practice presupposes a moral economy of
social status as zero-sum, a form of positional competition. One person’s
honor is attained at the expense of another’s debasement.
By contrast, exchange on the basis of mutual self-interest can preserve
the independence and dignity of both parties. Capitalism, by enabling ordi-
nary people to make a living without depending on noblesse oblige, thereby
transformed the moral economy of social standing to a more egalitarian and
potentially universalizable footing. Dignity is not a competitive good. It is
universalizable. Expressing respect to another in a mutually self-interested
exchange need not come at the cost of one’s own dignity.
4. NORMATIVE ASSUMPTIONS OF ECONOMIC THEORY: LIBERTARIAN
AND PARETIAN SCHOOLS
Thus, the transition to a capitalist ethic of debt increased freedom and equal-
ity. The classical economists had the ethical concepts needed to commend
this transformation. Would economic theory today approve of it? Consider
the two main schools of contemporary capitalist economic thought. First,
there is libertarian political economy, including such figures as Friedrich
Hayek (1960; 1976), Robert Nozick (1974), and Richard Epstein (1998;
1995). This school takes freedom to be the central good. Second, there
is the school of Paretian welfare economics, founded by Vilfredo Pareto
(1971), and standardized in introductory economics textbooks. This school
takes efficiency to be the central good.
The libertarian and Paretian schools of thought share a conception of cap-
italism based on abstract notions of private property and free markets: the
more property is held in private hands, and the more freely it can be traded
without state interference, the more capitalist it is. Both schools argue that
capitalism is the best economic system, on the basis of abstract arguments
about the nature of private property and market transactions. Privatization
of productive resources encourages improvements and hence raises pro-
ductivity. State-imposed limitations on contracts restrict the freedom of
the contracting parties to trade one thing for another. Setting aside monop-
olies, externalities and information asymmetries, such limitations cannot
be Pareto efficient. For if each of the parties prefers the other’s possession to
that which they own, then both sides could gain if they were allowed to trade.
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There is an intimate connection between the libertarian and Paretian ef-
ficiency schools of thought. Although libertarians identify individual free-
dom with property rights, this representation shows us only one side of the
coin. The essence of a private property right is not the individual’s freedom
to use the item in question, since the individual also enjoys this right if
the item is in the commons. It is rather the use of state power to restrict
the freedom of other people to use it. A libertarian system can justify this
restriction of freedom only by arguing that the freedom secured to the
owner is more valuable than the freedom denied to others (Sterba, 1994;
Taylor, 1985). In practice, libertarians such as Nozick appeal to the classic
Pareto improvement criterion to justify the restrictions on liberty entailed
by private property (Nozick, 1974, p. 176–177). They thereby assume that
a restriction of liberty can be justified only if it makes no one worse off in
terms of welfare (not liberty) (DeLong, 2003).
Libertarians and Paretians differ over the determination of the initial
distribution of property. Libertarians believe that there are natural laws of
just appropriation that determine the initial distribution of property. Pare-
tians allow that the state could determine the initial distribution of property.
Both agree that after the initial distribution, free markets should determine
subsequent allocations (leaving aside externalities, monopolies, and infor-
mation asymmetries). Libertarians and Paretians thus share a proceduralist
conception of justice. They deny that the identity of the owners matters to
the justice of a property distribution.
5. LIBERTARIAN EVALUATION OF THE CAPITALIST ETHIC OF DEBT
Consider now whether libertarians would approve of the transition from an
aristocratic to a capitalist ethic of debt. Recall the critical legal features of
this transition: (1) abolition of debt peonage; (2) abolition of bondage and
debtors’ prison; (3) discharge of a bankrupt’s debts, at the instigation of the
debtor. The transition also involved cultural changes in the motivational
appeal and meaning of debtor–creditor interaction, from flattery to self-
interest, from subordination to equality.
Libertarians would reject the three legal changes as violations of natural
property rights. Debt peonage arises from a contract in which the debtor
agrees to remain in the exclusive service of his creditor until the loan is paid
off. Notoriously, such contracts are rigged to keep the debtor in permanent
subjection, unable to bid for higher wages by threatening to take up another
employer’s superior offer. Yet libertarians hold that the creditor has a right
to full enforcement of the terms of such contracts (Nozick, 1974, p. 331).
State abolition of debt peonage is an unjust violation of rights to property
and freedom of contract. Similar considerations apply to the abolition of
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bondage and imprisonment as remedies for default. A pure system of free
contract could not question the voluntary acceptance of these remedies.
Most importantly, discharge of the bankrupt’s debts violates the creditor’s
supposed natural rights to the debtor’s property.
The case of bankruptcy puts libertarians in a difficult position. If they
insist on their system of natural liberty, many state constructions of private
property, essential to modern capitalism, cannot be justified. Bankruptcy is
just one example. The limited liability corporation is another. A group or
artificial person cannot escape liabilities to which its individual members
would be subject. Intellectual property is another. Patents and copyrights,
unlike natural property rights, expire. Patent law also denies independent
inventors the right to exploit their inventions, if they are not the first to
file for a patent. Negligence rules, as opposed to strict liability in torts, are
another (Epstein, 1975). Many of the enabling laws of modern capitalism,
from the laws of partnerships, incorporation, securities and banking, to the
uniform commercial code, are not merely state enforcements of natural
property rights.
Libertarianism also endorses systems of unfree labor, provided they
were established contractually rather than by birth or conquest. It has no
objection to the company towns of the past, in which workers were paid
in scrip that could be redeemed only at company stores. In one such town,
Pullman, Illinois, workers had to sign leases for company-owned housing,
whereby the company owner dictated details of their home lives. As owner
of the town, Pullman appointed himself mayor and forbad the construction
of any churches but his own (Walzer, 1983, pp. 295–297). Since these
arrangements were contractual, libertarians have no objection to them. But
this isn’t capitalism. It’s feudalism.
It is futile to argue that free market competition would eventually enable
people to leave these towns and build freer lives. Once it is conceded that
such arrangements do not enable people to lead free and dignified lives
as equals, there is no point in waiting for market forces to end these an-
ticompetitive arrangements, when legal means can directly abolish them.
Perhaps some libertarians would concede this point. This is to accept that
some rights are so deeply connected to the self that they cannot be alienated
without compromising the individual’s standing as a free and equal person
(Radin, 1982; 1987). To accept market-inalienable rights leads libertari-
anism away from abstract freedom of contract. It requires abandonment
of neutrality about who owns which items of property. Market-inalienable
rights suppose that it is vital that each individual permanently retain certain
liberty rights over her own person. To accept this is also to abandon the
monetized version of the Pareto-improvement test for a just allocation of
property. Willingness-to-pay is not a valid measure of the value of a right
being possessed by a particular person. Rather, given that all property rights
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in a good secure a liberty for some by coercively depriving others of liberty
to use that good, the relative value of these mutually exclusive liberties
depends on whether they realize the freedom (personal independence) and
equal standing of persons.
Once we accept that a person’s claim to a property right depends on
whether her possession of that right promotes freedom and equality, the
way is open for additional regulations of trade. There can be no objection on
grounds of natural rights to the market-restricting laws made in capitalist
countries to protect the dignity of persons, including antidiscrimination
laws, minimum wage and maximum hours laws, and so forth.
Capitalism enabled the mass of people to see themselves as entitled to
respect and dignity in their commercial relations. This is the great cultural
transformation marked by the transition from an aristocratic to a capitalistic
ethic of credit. Once people see themselves as so entitled, they make use
of the law to secure and extend these entitlements. The legal constraints on
contract ensure that the workings of the market do not backslide into feu-
dalism, that capitalism does not undermine its own cultural achievements.
The form of capitalism they bring about is not libertarian laissez faire, but
rather capitalism as we know it in the advanced democracies.
6. PARETIAN EVALUATION OF THE CAPITALIST ETHIC OF DEBT
How should Paretian welfare economists judge the transition to a capitalist
ethic of debt? They should have no principled objection to the discharge of
a bankrupt’s debts. When business cycles force many individuals and firms
to go bankrupt at the same time, discharge is a critical tool for avoiding a
permanently stagnant economy.
However, other aspects of the capitalist legal transformation distribute
property rights in ways that forbid contractual reallocation. The Coase
Theorem (Coase, 1988) explains why this is inefficient. It states that the
allocation of property rights makes no difference to efficiency, as long as
the parties are free to cheaply bargain their way to an alternative allocation.
The Coase Theorem can be applied to the prohibition of debt peonage and
debtors’ prison. If a debt peon’s labor would be more productive to another
employer than to his master, he could persuade the master to release him
from peonage by signing over part of his future wages. But if he can’t
persuade the master to release him, then it is more efficient to keep him
a peon. So peonage should be permitted. Similarly, if a debtor is worth
more to his creditors working than in prison, they will agree to release
him. Creditors who want a monetary return from their debtor will offer
to pay those who prefer to take their pound of flesh to agree to release
the debtor from prison. If the payment is not enough to persuade, then
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it is more efficient to keep the debtor in jail. So debtors’ prison should
also be permitted, as long as creditors are free to negotiate their way to
an alternative. The Coase Theorem entails that the aristocratic system of
credit was efficient after all.3
By contrast, inefficiencies are built into modern creditor–debtor law.
If peonage contracts are forbidden, then presumably some people will be
denied credit who might have obtained it under such terms. This denies
both creditor and debtor a bargain that would supposedly be to the advan-
tage of both. The Paretian economist should oppose the transition from an
aristocratic to a capitalist ethic of debt as inefficient.
Against this reasoning, I would argue that classical economics has a
better case for the superior efficiency of the capitalist order. This argument
insists that the creditor–debtor relationship should be regarded as purely
commercial, not a matter of honor. It is a sophisticated attempt to persuade
people to see the stakes differently. Both dignitary and pecuniary inter-
ests are at stake in creditor–debtor relations. Under the aristocratic system,
dignity is measured in terms of honor, a positional good. From a digni-
tary perspective, interactions benefit one party at the expense of the other.
Moreover, to maintain the honor-based system, all its participants must
suffer in pecuniary terms. The result is an economically stagnant society
in which only the upper classes enjoy dignity. Under the capitalist system,
dignity is measured in terms of respect, a nonpositional, universalizable
good. Debtor–creditor interactions can proceed on a basis of mutual re-
spect. Capitalist laws, by freeing debtors to pursue the highest pecuniary
return on their labor, enable everyone to gain in monetary terms. The result
is a prosperous society in which everyone can enjoy dignity.
The advantages of the latter society are obvious. To the aristocrat, still
jealous of his honor, it may be asked: why should the coercive power of the
state be deployed to underwrite a system of laws catering to the sense of
honor, when this comes at such great cost to everyone’s prosperity and to
most people’s dignity? It is unreasonable to expect others to accept a moral
economy of dignity like this. This argument does not take preferences as
given. It argues that some economies of dignity are better able to satisfy
everyone than others. This is a reason to change preferences.
3Considerations of efficient breach do not defeat this conclusion. Paretians hold that
the proper remedy for breach of contract is not specific performance, but compensation of
the injured party for damages. See, e.g., Posner (1973, p. 88). They assume that damages
for breach can be measured in terms of the market value of the injured party’s losses.
But aristocratic preferences resisted monetization, because they aimed to ensure that credit
circulated in a moral economy of honor rather than pure profit. If we take the Paretian logic
of given preferences seriously, we cannot assume that honorific damages can always be
monetized.
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7. LESSONS FOR ECONOMICS TODAY
I want to draw four lessons from the capitalist transformation of creditor–
debtor relations. They concern (1) the normative framework of economics;
(2) the representation of capitalism; (3) the cultural significance of capitalist
transformation; and (4) implications for international economics.
7.1. The Normative Framework of Economics
I have argued that the normative framework of the classical economists
Smith and Condorcet, is superior to that of neoclassical economics and
libertarians. The classical economists had superior conceptions of freedom
and equality, which are better able to grasp the specific virtues of capitalism.
Contemporary economic theory cannot represent these virtues because
it is too abstract. Economic theory represents capitalist causal forces as
operating through unfettered free market exchanges. Their virtue consists
in the satisfaction of given preferences, or their expression of free choice.
These causal forces and virtues are represented in ways that abstract from
the content of the preferences, the terms of the contracts, the identities of the
parties, and the social meanings of their interactions. This abstraction pre-
vents contemporary economic theory from distinguishing a loan extended
within an aristocratic moral economy of debt from one extended within a
capitalist moral economy of debt. This distinction matters enormously for
the freedom, equality, and dignity of the parties to a contract. To represent
the specific virtues of capitalist transactions, freedom and equality must be
understood in terms of the concrete social relations of the contracting parties
during and after the exchange. A contract grounded in begging and self-
debasement is not a contract among equals. A contract whose terms or reme-
dies involve bondage or servitude does not realize the freedom of the parties.
This is a problem with the powers of neoclassical economic theory to rep-
resent morally critical features of capitalism, and of economic systems more
generally. A conceptual framework that measures welfare only in purely
formal terms of preference satisfaction, or income and wealth, does not dis-
criminate between contracts that, from the point of view of the freedom and
dignity of the contractors, have very different values. This is not an inherent
infirmity of economics as such, but only of the dominant strain of Paretian
welfare economics. Alternative systems of measuring welfare, such as the
capabilities approach of Amartya Sen (1985), could incorporate such im-
portant considerations as whether the contracting parties live at the mercy
of their creditors or whether they can bargain for fair terms with dignity.4
4In the capabilities approach, multiple dimensions of welfare are concretely defined in
terms of functionings, such as literacy, mobility, nutritional status, and the ability to appear
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7.2. The Representation of Capitalism
Contemporary economic theory represents capitalist markets as a natural
kind, governed by autonomous laws operating independently of the state.
This representation assumes that there is some scientific, nonpolitical way
to distinguish the domain of the market from the state, “natural” property
rights from “artificial” state intervention. But we have seen that capital-
ism requires numerous artificial property rights. If the state pervasively
constitutes the parameters of the market, then many state actions labeled
“interference” in the market, such as labor laws, are better represented as
the constitution of artificial property rights. Many can be justified in the
same normative framework that displays the virtues of bankruptcy laws.
To preserve the substantive values of freedom and equality prized by the
classical economists, some of these property rights must be inalienable. If
bankruptcy law is part of capitalism, then the regulatory laws designed to
protect the freedom and equality of workers, consumers, and investors are
also part of capitalism, not an “interference” in its operations.
7.3. The Cultural Significance of Capitalist Transformation
Capitalism does not operate only through contractual exchanges, taking
preferences and laws as given. It changes preferences and laws. The expan-
sion of markets gave rise to a capitalist class, more interested in pecuniary
gain than honor or Christian virtue, who successfully demanded changes
in the legal and social norms governing credit. These changes wrested the
control and meanings of credit from aristocrats and clerics. Credit no longer
circulated within the sphere of contests for honor, but within the sphere of
contests for profit. This changed the self-understandings and hence the
preferences of creditors and debtors.
In stressing the class-based origins of the capitalist transformation of
credit, I want to emphasize that the extension of its benefits to wider classes
of people was not the automatic result of the autonomous workings of mar-
kets. It was the product of protracted political action. The first bankruptcy
laws in Britain and the United States limited eligibility for bankruptcy to
individuals engaged in commercial occupations (Mann, 2002, pp. 207–208,
222). But once the demoralization of insolvency based on an appreciation
of business cycles was invoked to allow wealthy capitalists off the hook,
it was only a matter of time before less privileged classes would come to
understand their predicament in the same terms and demand bankruptcy
protection for themselves. This isn’t laissez faire. It’s the popular use of
in public without shame. Capabilities are then defined as freedoms or effective opportunities
to attain vectors of functionings.
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state power to extend the privileges enjoyed by capitalists to everyone
else.
Such preference changes, being endogenous to capitalist markets, are as
much a part of the dynamic of capitalism as market exchange. The result
of these changes in Western Europe was social democracy. This was not a
repudiation of capitalism, but a fulfillment of the presuppositions of cap-
italist market exchange that Smith and Condorcet championed. It follows
that abstract laissez faire is but one (archaic) variant of capitalism, not its
ideal form. Social democracy is another variant. Let us grant that, in the
post-Cold War era (if it was not already obvious decades before), capitalism
is the only viable form of economic organization open to countries in the
developed and developing worlds. This fact implies nothing about which of
many possible capitalist paths any country should follow. It acknowledges
the folly of comprehensive state economic planning and ownership of the
means of production, the injustice of suppressing private entrepreneurship,
and the centrality of competitive market exchange, including international
trade, to any country’s prospects for development. But it takes no sides
between Hong Kong and Sweden.
7.4. Implications for International Economics
The use of democratic powers to extend the privileges enjoyed by capital-
ists to everyone else is still under way. Millions of people across the world
are trying to extend capitalist privileges to themselves, by such extralegal
means as squatting. Such actions violate the tenets of laissez faire capital-
ism, which demands strict enforcement of private property rights. But they
are part of the capitalist dynamic, as the Peruvian economist Hernando de
Soto argues (1989; 2000). Contemporary movements for the relief of debts
owed by developing nations manifest the same dynamic on an international
scale. If bankruptcy should be made available to individuals, it should also
be made available to countries.
When people enlist state power to escape oppressive contractual relations
and reformulate the rules of private property in ways that better comport
with their dignity, equality, and freedom, such movements should be seen
as realizing the promise of capitalism, not as violating its essence. To see
this, we must step out of the formalism of economic theory and represent
economic systems in terms of their import for substantive social relations
of freedom and equality.
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